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ABSTRACT
THE GLOBAL TREND TOWARD SECURITIZATION 
AND ITS REFLECTIONS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF TURKEY
BY
ÖZLEM UÇARKUŞ
SUPERVISOR; Assoc. ProL KÜRŞAT AYDOĞAN 
JUNE 1994
Last decade has been a period that was characterized by a series of developments in the 
international and domestic capital markets. Securitization, which essentially involves the 
transformation of financial assets into securities to be sold to investors in capital markets, 
was one of these major structural changes that has come to play an increasingly important 
role within these markets.
The aim of this study is to provide a better understanding of what securitization is and 
what it can offer as a new financing technique along with its implications for the Turkish 
tuuincial market. The study covers all aspects of securitization including its development, 
basic principles and structures together with the discussion of the associated benefits and 
risks. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the current securitization practice is provided 
in the context of Turkey along with some criticisms and suggestions for the future growth 
of as.set backed securities markets.
ÖZET
MENKUL KIYMETLEŞTİRMENİN DÜNYA 
[PİYASALARINDAKİ GELİŞİMİ VE 
l'ÜRKİYE'DEKİ YANSIMASI
Hazırlayan
ÖZLEM UÇARKUŞ
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İşletme Fakültesi 
Tez Yöneticisi : Doç. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
Geçtiğimiz on yıl boyunca uluslararası ve ulusal sermaye piyasaları bir dizi değişikliğe 
sahne oldular. Finansal varlıkların sermaye piyasalarındaki yatırımcılara satılmak üzere 
menkul kıymetleştirilmesi (seküritiza.syon), bu piyasalarda gittikçe önem kazanan en 
temel yeniliklerden biri olarak kendini gösterdi.
Bu çalışmanın amacı menkul kıymetleştirmenin kapsamım ve yeni bir Finansman tekniği 
olarak sunduklarını, Türk tinans piyasalarını da gözönüne alarak incelemektir. Çalışıntı, 
menkul kıymetleştirmeyi gelişimi, temel prensipleri ve işleyişi, sağladığı Faydalar ve 
içerdiği riskler ile ele almaktadır. Son bölümde, lürkiye'deki menkul kıymetleştirme 
süreci incelenmiş, varlığa dayalı menkul kıymetler ile ilgili bazı eleştiri ve önerilere yer 
verilmi.şlir.
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III the past two decades, the world's financial markets have witnessed the introduction of 
some remarkable new techniques one of which, no doubt, is the emergence of 
securitization. Its rapid expansion on a global scale has drawn great attention and 
considerable literature has focused on the mechanics of particular transactions and their 
benefits.
What exactly is securitization ? Various authors define the term differently but in a broad 
sense, it is a form of financial intermediation that involves the issuance of securities 
which repkice the traditional bank loans as well as the sales of asset backed securities 
(not limited to mortgages) which utilize financial intermediaries to originate loans, but 
use financial markets to determine the ultimate suppliers of funds (Ghandi, 1989). Guth 
(1986) defines the concept as the replacement or substitution of loans by tradeable 
securities but frequently supported by credit lines in the event of the issue becoming 
unplaceable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securitization is essentially a process that makes debt tradeable. In essence, it involves 
the displacement of credit flows from bank lending -bank credit intermediation- by 
marketable debt instruments (Gardener, 1986). In traditional intermediation the role of 
any financial intermediary is the matching of the ultimate lender with the ultimate 
borrower where it can reduce search costs and realize economies of scale in gathering and 
allocating funds. Gurley and Shaw (I960) referred to it as indirect finance.On the other 
liand, disintermediation calls for direct finance where ultimate lenders and borrowers deal 
directly with each other. The link with securitization comes if this indirect finance is 
conducted by moans of marketable securities (Gardener, 1988).
A narrower definition of securitization can be developed as the process under which pools 
o f individual loans and receivables are packaged, underwritten and distributed to 
investors in the form of securities. These securities are collateralized by the assets 
themselves or the cashflows arising from them which represent the primary source of 
repayment to the investor So, the originator of the loans finances itself not with the 
claims against its short-tenn or long-term liabilities or equities, rather by loan backed or 
asset backed securities (ABS), collateralized by the underlying receivables.
It is this characteristic that distinguishes securitization from other types of transactions 
such as a loan syndication where the originator retains one part of its loan on its balance 
sheet and sells the remainder to other institutions or a loan sale where the entire loan is 
sold and removed from the balance sheet without issuing any securities using the 
potential cash flow from the original loans as collateral.
Another characteristic of securitization is that it allows financial institutions to specialize 
in that part of the loan-making process where they can best make use of their competitive 
advantage. Thus, a firm with a competitive advantage in the origination process may 
specialize in the operations of origination such as granting of the loan, investigating the 
quality of the borrower and arranging the terms of the loan. This seperation of 
origination, funding, servicing and assumption of credit risk as well as the specialization 
of the roles associated with the process make the subject of securitization so interesting 
and its implications so far reaching.
'lioiisilKI'WO), p. 2.
I. I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIZATION
After having defined securitization it is necessary to focus on the forces that led to the 
sudden development of this new securitization market.
The first modern securitizations were carried out in the early I970's by the US. 
GoverniTicnt National Mortgage Association (GNMA) with the issuance of mortgage 
pass-through certificates. At that time, tlic banking sector was still suffering from the 
consequences of the international debt crisis and the economic recession that greatly 
weakened their status. The sudden increase in cross-border lending during 1970's which 
was encouraged by the government raised concerns over capital adequacy. Supervisory 
authorities made heavy provisions for international and national loans and also raised 
banks' capital ratios substantially. As a result, even the most powerftil international banks 
lost their favorable ratings and their standing on the market dropped below that of many 
of their large customers, the multinational corporations.
The accompanied sharp rise in interest rate volatility increased both the cost of reserve 
requirements and the effective cost of capital. Thus, the cost of holding a loan on the 
balance sheet exceeded the lending rate and banks responded to this higher cost by 
canceling or reducing credit lines. Origination of loans for sale as participations emerged 
as a business line.
All of the above mentioned factors -the high level o f interest rates in the late I970's and 
early 1980's, the higher capital requirements imposed by bank regulators and the high 
cost o f capital- have reduced the market power of banking institutions and at the same 
lime widened the spread between deposit rates and the cost of holding loans on balance.
sheet. This development was perhaps the basic driving force behind securitization and 
helps to explain its broad base.
Starting in early 1980's, many of the structural regulations 2 on the operations of banks 
were removed. The result was an increased competition between different classes of 
Unancial intermediaries such as commercial and savings banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. In this environment, many investment banks and broking firms started to 
capture business away from the traditional financial intermediaries by specializing in 
underwriting and placement of securities. Underwriting securities which has traditionally 
been expensive relative to bank lending has become less costly. The reduction in the costs 
of packaging, underwriting relative to the difference between the cost of booking loans 
and the cost of deposits encouraged the shift toward securitization.
Another type of change contributing to stronger securities demand over deposits was the 
institutionalization of savings in United States and other institutional countries 
(Gumming, 1987). The role of pension flmds, insurance companies, savings plans and 
mutual funds in the financial system was enhanced by their tax-exempt status, lower 
transaction costs and greater diversification, instead of reliance on deposit-based 
intermediaries.
Furthermore, the development of techniques for analyzing and managing risk ( such as 
options, futures and other hedging instruments ) reduced the dependency ol institutional 
investors on banks to achieve relatively liquid and safe portfolios. This management of 
risks also substituted for the transformation performed by banks. Combined with the 
increased volatility in interest rates, the higher volatility in perceived credit quality of
-rcuiilmions llial scl bouiuls to the operations ofbanks aiul other institutions in terms oftypes o f husiness 
that they may undertake and the regions in which they may operate.
banks enhanced the desire for liquidity or transferability on the part of investors. This was 
one o f the major reasons why securitization became more attractive and also helps to 
explain the recent efforts for creating new markets for securities and enhancing secondary 
market liquidity.
Finally, the market's development can also be attributed to the advances in technology. 
With the introduction of computers a significant computing power was made available to 
financial engineers. Consequently, the financial markets have been provided with an 
enormous capacity and ability to analyze and structure highly sophisticated and sensitive 
transactions. This facilitated the innovation and application of many new financial 
instruments and techniques as well as accelerated the process of securitization.
In short, securitization was driven by both short-run and long-run forces. In the short-run, 
the high volatility in interest rates along with an increased cost o f capital for the financial 
sector constitute a temporary force to the growth of securitization. However, the long-run 
changes such as increased competition brought about by the deregulation in banking 
laws, institutionalization of savings, strong demand for liquidity and the decline in 
information and transaction costs are all factors that permitted the securities markets to 
expand and substitute traditional financial intermediation in many respects.
I. 2. STRUCTURE OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
All ABS can be structured in various ways some of which will be discussed 
in the next chapter in more detail. However, most of the securitization 
schemes have some common structural features and it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of this structure before examining the advantages 
and risks in ABS schemes . A typical ABS transaction can be diagrammed as 
shown in Figure 1.
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At the first step, the originator with a pool of receivables (or loans) transfers or sells the 
portfolio to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) (1). An SPV is an institution which is 
established separately from the originator with the purpose of issuing ABS's to investors 
(2). It then uses the proceeds o f the issue to pay the originator for the purchased portfolio 
of assets (3 & 4).
One reason of the establishment of an SPV is to enable the firm securitizing its 
receivables to write them off from its balance sheet completely. Only then can it benefit 
from an improvement in its debt/equity ratio. A second reason concerns the security of 
the investors. Without the existence of an SPV it would be very difficult to isolate the 
claims of other creditors on the assets underlying the issue.
Furthermore, it separates the credit risk of the receivables from that of the originator and 
assures a timely payment of principal and interest o f the ABS regardless of any changes· 
in the credit quality o f the originator. To accomplish this, the transfer of assets from the 
originator must represent a true sale ox in other words
- The transfer should be treated as a sale for accounting and tax purposes
- The originator should not retain any benefits of ownership such as entitlement to 
the appreciation of the assets or using their proceeds
- The documents should show that the parties involved intend that the transfer of 
assets is characterized as a sale
hionsiilKIWO), p. 251.
SPV then charges its entitlement to all payments received from the pool o f receivables to 
a trustee (5) which represents the investors and ultimately distributes the proceeds, less 
the servicing fees, to them (6). The trustee holds a critical role because it must perform 
the duties necessary to fulfill the indenture obligations and maintain investor rights.
Some form o f credit support is required to protect the issue against credit losses resulting 
from a failure of the receivables to generate sufficient income to fund the payments to the 
investors. This is often provided by a third party credit facility (7). The rating agencies 
examine the historical performance of the underlying receivables and assess the 
sufficiency of the cash flows generated by the assets and the likelihood of any defaults. A 
level of credit enhancement is then specified for the ABS to ensure the timely payment of 
cash flows.
Credit enhancement is often provided by a pool insurance policy that meets any loss 
incurred as a result o f the cash insufficiency to repay the issue (8). Other forms o f 
external credit support include bank letter of credit, guaranteed investment contract, 
guaranteed rate agreement, liquidity advance and interest rate swaps (Pitman et. al., 
1990). The originator pays a fee for the service of the credit provider (9). The most usual 
types o f credit enhancement used include:
* Over-collateralization: refers to the amount of receivables placed by the originator in 
the ABS that exceeds its par value. This excess serves to protect the cash flows from any 
seasonal fluctuations, delinquencies or defaults.
* Letter o f  Credit is usually used to allow the ABS to obtain higher ratings than its 
issuer. To accomplish this, a highly rated bank or institution underwrites the LOC and 
guarantees a specified percentage of the receivables from losses.
* Repurchase Agreements: are made with the originator who contracts to buy back a 
specific percentage of the receivables at face value. This method supports the ABS but 
does not tie up originator's assets as in the case o f over-collateralization. However, the 
face value of the repurchase agreement appears on the originator's balance sheet.
Where the credit enhancement is provided by a third party, the creditworthiness o f the 
ABS becomes dependent upon the credit quality o f the enhancer. Thus, the resulting 
credit rating of the ABS wilt be at most as high as the credit rating of the enhancer, in the 
event that the investors have to rely upon the credit enhancement for timely servicing of 
the issue, they will be exposed to the creditworthiness of the credit enhancer. Therefore, 
an external credit enhancer is regarded as the weakest link in the structure (Pitman et. al., 
1990).
To eliminate this weakness some alternative forms o f credit support are also used such as 
over-collateralization or issuance of subordinated notes by the SPV for which the 
principal and interest payments rank behind payments on the senior notes.
The servicing functions o f the issue are usually carried out by the originator since in some 
cases it is difficult for another party to be the servicer. The originator continues to service 
the borrowers in return for a fee (10). The servicer plays a crucial role in maintaining the 
credit quality with its functions such as determination of interest rates on assets, 
management of the flow of payments from borrower to the issuer, and the reinvestment of 
idle cash in short term investments.
I. 3. NATURE OF THE ASSETS TO BE SECURITIZED
After having developed a general struchire of the securitization process it is also 
necessary to make a brief evaluation of the assets that can be candidates of these types of 
transactions. Clearly, securitization has an awesome potential since there are huge 
amounts of debts and receivables in the financial markets. Any company doing something 
other than a pure cash business has streams of payments flowing in and actually financial 
institutions are nothing more than collections of receivables.
However, the selection o f the assets to be securitized is also an important issue since 
different characteristics of different kinds of debt have to be considered. Right now, most 
authors agree that an asset to with predictable cash flows, with low and stable default 
losses and a history of timely payment of both interest and principal is the simplest to 
securitize. In brief, the assets should ideally have the following characteristics:
/. be well diversified
2. hiive a statistical history o f  loss experience
3. be homogenous in nature
4. be broadly sim ilar in repayment and final maturity structure
5. be to some extent liquid
The diversification and homogeneity characteristics of the assets to be securitized are 
closely related to their riskiness. The risks inherent in the securitization process will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter IV.
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Obviously, the riskiness of a loan-backed security is the main determinant o f its price. 
The riskier the security the lower its price and the higher its yield. Therefore, if the yield 
on the underlying pool of loans, the benefits from securitizing may be eliminated because 
the securities would now be riskier than the underlying assets.
If the assets are well diversified, demographically and geographically, and highly 
homogenous, the cash flows will be relatively stable and the delinquencies will be more 
predictable which makes it easier to evaluate the portfolio. Most of the time, the cost of 
portfolio evaluation includes the premium paid to the insurer and the credit enhancer. 
Thus, the cost of evaluating complicated portfolios will be high and may eliminate the 
benefits of securitization. In short, the easier a portfolio is to evaluate the more likely that 
it will be securitized.
The credit characteristics of the underlying assets should also be clear to both investors 
and rating agencies. Loans that are very large or have complex credit characteristics are 
better suited for whole loan sales or loan participations. Other credit characteristics that 
are crucial for securitization are a well defined payments pattern, size and a sufficiently 
long maturity (at least 2 years).
Although most of the credit card receivables are successfully securitized, many retail 
receivables could not, due to their small size and relatively short maturity. Such loans pay 
off so quickly that it is not worth securitizing them since the costs almost totally exceed 
its benefits.
Commercial and industrial loans (C&l) are also difficult to securitize. One reason is that 
these loans are not homogenous in nature and the terms and structures vary greatly across 
borrowers.
11
For example, the maturity of C&I loans ranges from less than one year to eight years. 
Secondly, the pricing of the C&I loans also varies since the stream of payments from a 
C&I loan is not fixed. Therefore, they are repriced frequently and the timing of payments 
are structured in a way to meet individual borrower needs.
A further problem is related to the credit characteristics o f C&I loans. Some of these 
loans are collateralized and other are not. Even if the loans are collateralized , the 
collateral differs across loans and there may not be a ready market for the collateral in the 
event of default. This makes the evaluation of C&I loans extremely difficult.
Yet, one type of commercial loan has been securitized. Small business loans granted by 
Small Business Administration (SBA) are fairly standard and the federal government 
assumes much of the risk for a pool of SBA loans by guaranteeing 85 percent o f the 
principal and interest. However, only a small part of SBA loans have been securitized and 
the number o f participants in this market is very small ( Pavel, 1986).
Mortgage loans, on the other hand, represent clearly the above mentioned characteristics 
that make a loan a prime candidate for securitization. They are homogenous in nature and 
are, therefore, relatively easy to evaluate. There is also an active secondary market for the 
whole mortgage loans which provides liquidity and information about the delinquency or 
prepayment rates are readily available. Also, the structures and the terms of mortgage 
loans (especially fixed-rate loans) are similar. With the collateral backing them the credit 
characteristics of mortgage loans have been almost excellent. It is perhaps the mortgage 
loan that opened the way for securitization. But now many different kinds of financial 
assets are being turned into marketable securities.
12
Clearly, the success of the mortgage market has prompted the development of other 
structures and at present the following receivables have been securitized
credit enrds
¿¡uto locins
boat loans
marine loans
furniture loans
home equity loans
non-performing loans
unsecured consumer locins
manufactured bousing loans
auto leases
utility leases 
computer leases 
municipal equipment leases 
trade receivables 
health care receivables 
Euro trade receivables 
junk bonds 
insurance premiums 
recreational vehicle receivables 
political subdivision bonds
Next chapter will look at some of these asset-backed securities and provide examples 
about various issues.
^nonsall(lW)), p. 243.
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II. ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
II. 1. THE U.S. MORTGAGE MARKET
The origin of the securitization process is obviously the mortgage market, and the course 
that the securitization process has taken in that area says much about the possibilities in 
other sectors. Home mortgages were once the longest term, most illiquid, most localized 
o f all financial instruments. However, in I970's the federal government increased its 
efforts in order to create a liquid secondary market in mortgages. One of the agencies 
facilitating these efforts was the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) that 
was founded in 1938 and authorized to buy and sell federally insured mortgages. In 1968, 
it was split into two parts to include the Government National Mortgage Association 
(GNMA). GNMA was authorized to guarantee principal and interest on securities issued 
by private lenders. This guarantee was backed by the U.S. government and was perhaps 
the basic underlying force on the growth of the so called pass-through market.
Since then, this market has exploded, and coming to 1990's new mortgage-backed 
securities exceeded the total volume of new issues of stocks and bonds. As much as 80 
percent o f new single-family home mortgages was being sold into the secondary market 
and securitized. Securitization has spread to adjustable-rate mortgages, and even mobile- 
home loans (Shapiro, 1985).
II. 1. 1. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
As mentioned before, this was the first type of asset backed securities and was developed 
by the GNMA in 1970 as a mortgage-backed security collateralized by FHA (Federal
14
Housing Administration) and VA (Veterans Administration) mortgage loans. A pass­
through certificate represents a direct ownership in a pool of mortgages and the payment 
streams From these mortgages. The portfolio is sold to a trust and the certificates of 
ownership are then sold to capital market investors. The originator continues to service 
the mortgage portfolio by collecting interest and principal from borrowers and passing 
them monthly to the investors. In a pass-through structure :
* The ownership of the mortgages goes to the investors
* The debt does not appear on the originator's financial statement since pass-throughs 
are not debt obligations of the mortgage originator
* All repayments on the underlying mortgages are passed to investors
Since GNMA guarantees timely payment of interest and principal on its pass-throughs 
(called Ginnie Maes) the securities are not subject to default risk and the active secondary 
market provides a high degree of liquidity and marketability. It is this feature that led to 
the sudden growth of pass-through securities. While Ginnie Maes are still the dominant 
forrn in the market, similar securities are developed in 1971 and 1981 by Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae). The only distinction was that these were not backed by federally 
guaranteed mortgages, rather by mortgages either insured or uninsured by private, 
mortgage insurers.
II. 1. 2. Mortgage Backed Bonds (MBBs)
Another type of security that is collateralized by a pool of mortgages or other assets is the 
mortgage-backed bond. Like a regular bond, the interest payments are made semiannually 
and the principal is repaid in Full amount at the end of maturity.
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However, in the event o f default the trustee may sell the collateral in order to meet the 
MBB holders' claims. In a MBB structure ;
* Ownership of the mortgages remains with the issuer since these are the debt 
obligations of the issuer
* Pool of mortgages used as collateral remain on the issuer's financial statement as 
assets and the MBBs are reported as liabilities
* The cash flows from the collateral are not dedicated to the investors in the form of 
payment of principal and interest (semiannual interest payments + repayment of 
principal at maturity)
Most MBBs are rated AAA as a result of their over-collateralization which means that the 
value of collateral is much greater than the obligation of the borrower under the MBB 
issue. The collateral is evaluated on a quarterly basis and more collateral must be added if 
its value falls below the level stated in the bond indenture.
There are three reasons for the over-collateralization of MBBs. First, because the cash 
flows accrue to the issuer rather than to the bondholders , the outstanding balance o f any 
mortgage pool may decline faster over time than the principal on the MBBs. Second, the 
excess collateral provides additional protection to the bondholder against default on 
individual mortgages in the portfolio. Third, the excess collateral protects bondholders 
from declines in the market value of the collateral between valuation dates. Because 
payment of principal and interest accrues to the issuer and can be used for reinvestment 
the issuer may prefer to use over-collateralization (Pavel, 1986). Although they require a 
substantial over-collateralization MBBs are still very popular among private issuers since 
they offer a cheap form of funding with favorable ratings.
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[i. 1. 3. Mortgage Pay-through Bonds
The final type of mortgage-backed securities is a combination of both pass-throughs and 
mortgage-backed bonds. Like an MBB the pay-through bond is a general obligation of 
the issuer secured by a portfolio of mortgage assets. In a mortgage pay-through structure :
■" The ownership of the mortgages remains with the issuer (like MBBs)
* The cash flows from the mortgages are dedicated to the servicing of the bonds (in a 
way similar to that of pass-throughs)
They appear as debt on the issuer's financial statements
The most popular type of this stmcture is the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) 
which was first issued by Freddie Mac (FHLMC) in June 1983. Each issue was divided 
into three maturity classes with semiannual interest payments. Class 1 bondholders 
received principal payments and any prepayments until Class 1 bonds were completely 
paid·off. Class2 bondholders received principal payments and prepayments before Class3 
bondholders received any principal payments. Class 1 bonds were repaid within five years 
of the offering date, Class2 bonds within twelve years and Class3 within twenty years.
The very different maturity and average lives of these different bond classes mean that 
the investor base may be effectively segmented. Class 1 bonds will be sold to short-term 
investors, Class2 bonds will be sold to natural buyers of intermediate term instruments 
and Class3 bonds appeal to longer term investors who are prepared to accept some degree 
of uncertainty over the maturity of the bond. In this way, different classes of CMO may 
be tan^eted at investors with very different maturity and average life requirements.
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Furthermore, a CMO makes the term ot securities more certain by providing the investors 
with a kind o f call protection. Because CMO's eliminate prepayment risk (which will be 
discussed in next chapters) and provide shorter maturity classes than pass-throughs with 
relatively long final maturities, investors who are unlikely to buy this type o f security 
have been attracted to the mortgage securities market.
[I. 2. THE SECURITIZATION OF OTHER TYPES OF ASSET
Although most loans packaged and sold in secondary markets are mortgages, other types 
of loans have also been securitized.
II. 2. I. Collateralized Automobile Receivables ( CARS )
The largest market in securities backed by assets other than mortgages is the market in 
securities secured by automobile receivables or car loans. There are two types of auto 
loans: /. direct loans: made by the ¡ending institution
a. indirect loans: generated by the auto dealer and sold to the lending institution
CARS portfolios mostly include indirect loans that are fixed-rate and paid monthly with 
two to seven years maturities. They are similar to pass-through securities in which the 
underlying auto loans are passed on to the security holders. The car loans are sold to a 
trust which then sells certificates to investors. A fixed coupon is paid, with principal and· 
interest usually payable monthly to the owners of the certificates. The final principal 
payment is usually up to five years from the issue. The difference between the coupon 
payments and the streams from the underlying receivables is then used to pay servicing
IS
fees. CARS generally require a higher servicing fee than do mortgage-backed securities 
because an auto loan requires more monitoring. The collateral, a car, is not stationary, and 
the collateral does not maintain its value as well as a house.
CARS were developed and first issued by Salomon Brothers in January 1985. To gain a 
better understanding of this structure it wilt be beneficial to analyze one of Salomon 
Brothers' CARS issues in more detail.
EXAMPLE: Salomon Brothers Receivables Inc, C A R S  Series 1 ^
Salomon Brothers Receivables Inc., Series I (SAL 1) is a special purpose company 
established as a limited purpose, bankruptcy-remote legal entity with the sole purpose of 
issuing asset-backed obligations. Marine Midland Bank purchased and bundled a group 
of installment sale contracts from car dealers and sold them to SAL 1. The issue 
represented a pay-through structure similar to CMOs and is shown in Figure 2..
SAL I's notes represent two classes of senior debt that pay quarterly. Class Y has a 
coupon of 8.15 % with a guaranteed tennination date of 1989 and Class A has a coupon 
of 8.5 % with a guaranteed termination date of 1990. The logic for having two classes is 
to provide varying maturities , thereby allowing the issuer to dynamically manage cash 
fiow uncertainty resulting from prepayments. Additionally, it is also attractive to 
investors because this eliminates the maturity uncertainity.
^iclojiicd from Honsall p. 256.
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The transaction was supported by three credit enhancements which were issued by the 
Union Bank o f Switzerland. The LOG serves to protect cash flows from problems with 
the underlying receivables. If these receivables default, the Trustee (Chemical Bank) will 
draw on the LOG. The Guaranteed Investment Contract serves to protect cash flows from 
reinvestment risk. If interest rates dropped sharply, this could affect the yield on 
intermediate cash flows. The Purchase Agreement assures the notes' guaranteed maturity.
To summarize. Marine Midland Bank, rated below AA, was able to attain AAA rates 
through the SAL 1 structure. This transaction, which was structured similarly to a CMO, 
attracted investors because it paid quarterly over a maximum guaranteed life. With a 
combination of proper credit enhancement SAL I was able to offer two AAA notes that 
resembled traditional corporate debt.
II. 2. 2. Certificates For Amortizing Revolving Debts (CARDS)
The securitization of credit card receivables started in April 1986 when Salomon Brothers 
arranged the private placement of a pool of Bank One credit card receivables. For the first 
18 months of the stated five year life, only payments of interest were made and the 
principal payments of the underlying receivables were used to purchase more receivables. 
After the first 18 months, investors receive principal payments. Since CARDS were not 
guaranteed by a third-party Bank One established a reserve fund equal to twice the 
historical default rate on credit card debt. When the cards mature, if there are no defaults 
within the pool, the bank replaces the entire value ot the reserve fund.
The over-collateralization of the CARDS serves to protect against fluctuations in the 
receivables, leaving the investors' cash flows unaffected. Additionally, they amortize in a 
relatively short period because of the traditionally high monthly principal payment rates.
21
CARDS may be interesting to investors even though the credit standing of the individual 
borrowers is likely to be low. This is the result o f the great diversification which follows 
from the relatively small size of the individual credit card account.
E X A M P L E : Spiegel Charge Account T ivstN o  I ^
Spiegel Inc. is a German retail mail-order merchant that provides open-ended revolving 
consumer credit to its customers. In December 1988, it securitized its Preferred Charge 
credit card receivables via the Spiegel Charge Account Trust No 1 (SCAT 1) offering 
$150 million in investor certificates. The structure of the transactions are provided in 
Figure 3.
As shown, Spiegel Inc. sold $190 million worth of credit card receivables to Spiegel 
Credit Corporation (SCC). This is a special purpose corporation which serves as an 
intermediary in order to isolate the receivables from any claims Spiegel Inc.'s creditors 
may have against the assets in the event of bankruptcy.
SCC then sells the receivables to the SCAT 1 Credit Card Trust for $190 million, which 
in turn issues $ 150 million worth of investor certificates to the lead underwriter, Deutsche 
Bank Capital Corporation (DBCC). The Tnist then channels the $150 million cash and a 
$40 million Seller's Certificate back to Spiegel Inc.. Spiegel will continue to service the 
receivables, passing the cash flows down through the structure to the investors. Any 
excess servicing income will be paid to a spread account which will fund the cost of 
Deutsche Bank's 30% LOC. This 30 % LOC protects the Trust's cash flows from default 
or delinquent receivables.
ı^do|Uc(i from Bonsall p. 260.
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Finally, Deutsche Bank issued an additional $20 million service LOG to protect the pool 
if the servicer went bankrupt. The servicer, Spiegel Inc. collects receivables on a monthly 
basis and then passes them through the structure to the Trust at the end of the month. If 
Spiegel Inc. goes bankrupt, Deutsche Bank will compensate SCAT 1 to a maximum of 
$20 million. This ensures a timely payment and smooth flow of tlinds to the trust. If for 
some reason the servicer exceeds $20 million on its accrual account, the excess must be 
returned to the Trust's account.
The issue was structured so that during the first 36 months SCAT 1 will pay interest only. 
When the revolving period terminates, the pool will amortize over the next 12 months 
paying interest and a fixed rate principal reduction of 1/12 per month.
The beauty of this structure is that Spiegel was able to treat this sale as an off-balance 
sheet transaction. It converted $150 million o f risky receivables into cash at a relatively 
low cost, dynamically improving its balance sheet status. Spiegel was also able to treat 
the cash flows as a debt expense under tax accounting mles and lowered its cost o f 
capital. Moreover, this ABS structure allowed Spiegel Inc, an unrated company, to gain 
AAA rated fiinds that yield many basis points over comparable bonds.
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III. BENEFITS OF SECURITIZATION
In a well structured securitization scheme the underlying receivables of the originator are 
removed from its balance sheet, hence the purchasers of the ABS are protected against the 
changes in the credit quality of the issuer. The major benefits o f securitization derive 
directly from these features. The cotporations as originators, investors and finally, 
borrowers are drawn to the concept of securitization because of different reasons. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the benefits of securitization separately for the 
parties involved and for the financial system as a whole.
III. 1. Originators
Perhaps the main reason why many corporations are attracted to securitizing their 
financial assets is the liquidity that asset backed securities provide. Many institutions are 
able to exchange their illiquid assets for tradeable securities through the process of 
securitization. Especially in volatile times, this gives them an opportunity to turn the 
future payment streams into cash and increases their ability to manage their liquidity 
positions.
With the shift in the focus of many coiporations from corporate size to profitability 
another advantage of securitization has become apparent: off-bulancc sheet financing 
Through securitization banks and finance companies are able to effectively .reduce the 
quantity of equity capital they have to maintain. By permitting the elimination o f the 
same amount of assets and liabilities from the balance sheet, securitization improves the 
equity to assets ratio in the balance sheet, and thus facilitates compliance with the 
regulations that require minimum capital ratios. The ability to securitize and thereby
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remove some o f the assets from the balance sheet allows a firm or bank to originate more 
loans. By separating the origination from the ultimate lending of funds the firm which has 
an advantage in origination is able to grow more rapidly than it might otherwise be able 
to do. Conversely, a firm which has an easy access to funding but is at a disadvantage in 
originating quality loans can enhance the quality of its portfolio by acquiring securitized 
assets (Ghandi, 1989).
Securitization may also provide a firm with a relatively inexpensive source o f  funds, 
especially if its overall credit rating is lower than the credit rating on its receivables. By 
suitable credit enhancement techniques it is possible to construct an ABS scheme with a 
higher rating than that of the originating institution and to trade such securities at lower 
rates than available to the originator. It can also enable a depository institution to avoid 
intermediation taxes, i.e., reserve and capital requirements and deposit insurance 
premiums. If a depository institution sells ABS, it eliminates the underlying assets from 
its balance sheet and, therefore, no longer has to hold capital against those loans. Since 
the proceeds from the sale are not considered as deposits, the issuer does not have to hold 
reserves or pay for deposit insurance against the proceeds. As intermediation taxes 
increase this benefit from securitization would be expected to increase as well (Pavel, 
1986).
Another significant benefit of securitization is its impact on risk management. 
Traditionally, the originating institution retained the loan on its balance sheet and 
financed it with some combination of equity and capital. In doing so, it exposed itself to 
credit and interest rate risk. However, ABS provide a way of transferring the interest rate 
risk  from the originator to a third party. This can be extremely beneficial to finance 
companies that are highly sensitive to interest rate fluctuations since they usually 
originate loans which are longer temi than the underlying funding source. The resulting
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risk can be eliminated by matched funding which is actually very difficult to achieve tiilly 
in practice. At this point, an ABS enables this elimination by removing the assets from 
the balance sheet.
The transfer o f risky assets from the balance sheet may further help to improve a 
company's overall credit standing. The cTCiZ/rr/AA:arising from excessive concentration of 
a company's or bank's portfolio may effectively be reduced and exchanged with a fixed 
fee. This fee income is earned without an increase in the risk exposure o f the originator 
and this increasing fee income through ABS shifts portfolio earnings from interest-rate- 
sensitive spread income to fixed fee income.
Finally, securitization allows firms an cusy ¿icccss to the securities rmirkets, which are 
typically more efficient than direct loans, particularly when there is a large spread 
between the credit rating o f the firm and its receivables and provides diversification in 
terms of the source of ftinds while leaving the access of the firm to its usual sources o f 
financing unimpaired (Shaphiro, 1985).
III. 2. Investors and Borrowers
One, and perhaps the most important benefit of securitization to the investors is that the 
quality of the ABS issue is totally isolated from any changes in the quality o f the 
originator since the assets being securitized are being removed from the balance sheet and 
control of the originator. The expansion of the market with many different ABS schemes 
that are new and highly complex in nature, it has been able to offer investors a variety of 
securities with attributes that are designed to m e e t their portfolio needs more closely.
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In most cases, securitization may be invisible to the borrowers o f the institution 
securitizing its assets. The servicing and business relationship continues and the borrower 
may· never know his debt has been sold. Therefore, the immediate benefit of 
securitization to the borrowers is less apparent. However, in a reasonably competitive 
financial system, continued securitization should lead to lower rates charged to 
borrowers. Securitization may also benefit borrowers by increasing the availability o f 
credit on terms that the originator may be unwilling to provide if it were to fund the loans 
itself on its balance sheet( Ghandi, 1989). In U.S. mortgage market, homeowners were 
able to benefit from securitization since it has widened the pool of suppliers of funds and 
lowered their costs.
III. 3. Financial System
A primary function of a financial system is to transfer resources at low cost from the 
savers to the most efficient users. In that respect, securitization provides a more efficient 
flow of flinds from investors to borrowers, thus contributes to the operational efficiency 
of the financial system. Since securitization permits the unbundling o i the traditional loan, 
contract and allows the originating institution to concentrate on a limited number of 
stages firms are able to exploit their relative advantages more effectively.
By providing a new and wide source of funds available to lenders and improved risk and 
liquidity management techniques, securitization should lead to a more competitive 
financial system and to a drop in the cost of funds to borrows and in the cost of 
intermediation in the long run.
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[V. RISKS AND LIMITATIONS
As discussed before, securitization process is concerned with developing new instruments 
in which the product elements are decomposed, unbundled and passed to investors whose 
portfolio preferences match those specific characteristics. Thus, securitization is 
undertaken based on the following three main reasons : to attract new investors and fonds 
into the market, to remove the assets from the balance sheet and to spread the risk of the 
lending transaction.
In this sense, securitization is a process that can reshape the risk exposures inherent in a 
traditional banking transaction rather than eliminating them totally. Thus, some degree o f 
risk remains in the process, although in a different form. These risks can be identified as 
credit risk, cash flow risk, market risk and liquidity risk (Gardener, 1988).
IV. 1. Credit Risk
Credit risk can be defined as the possibility of default by the counter-party in a particular 
transaction. However, in the context of securitization credit risk is a derivation from the 
credit risk o f the underlying asset. At the fundamental level, the credit risk in the 
securitization flows or securitized assets is related to the original transaction. 
Securitization is not a tool for changing a poor loan into a good one! It is a means to shift 
the credit risk from the securitizing institution to the investor (the holder of the security). 
The risk is not shifted out of the system, but is rather unbundled out of the initial financial 
transactions. The credit risk is taken out from that of a traditional lending arrangement 
and is diversified into two dimensions: time and between the investor groups that buy the 
paper in the market.
2‘)
Since securitization reduces credit risk concentration in the system relative to traditional 
lending, the effect of a default is also decreased. This is because in this case the risk is 
spread over many investors in the market. This increases the potential strength and 
reduces the fragility of the system. However, it should again be noted that the credit risk 
is /70f eliminated through securitization and it may still remain concentrated in the hands 
of large investors within the system causing a potential threat for the system as a whole.
Credit risk of the collateral includes the credit strength of the receivables plus the 
originator's overall risk profile. In principle, the credit risk of the originator and the 
quality of the ABS are isolated from each other with the removal of the assets being 
securitized from the balance sheet of the originator. However, this requires the transaction 
be bulletproof because the issuer as well as the investors can be exposed to losses if the 
originator goes bankrupt. Thus, the transfer o f assets from the originator must represent a 
true sale which was mentioned before.
In practice, this stmcture may be more ambigous if the sale is with some sort of recourse 
to the seller of the assets. This also makes the consequent risk exposure unpredictable. 
For example, an originator concerned with maintaining its reputation and thus retaining 
access to the capital markets for subsequent ABS schemes may attempt to repurchase 
troubled securitized loans even when it bad no legal responsibility to do so (Ghandi, 
1988).
[V. 2. Cash Flow Risk
This type of risk is closely related to the credit risk of the underlying assets. The cash 
flows of an ABS are dependent on the cash flows from its underlying receivables. If for
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some reason the cash flows from the receivables are impaired through delinquency or 
default there must be an additional support. This support can take the form of over­
collateralization, letters of credit or repurchase agreements. The amount of credit 
enhancement is determined by evaluating maximum expected losses under different 
conditions (hyper-inflation, recession or depression). Additionally, the liquidity and 
interest rate sensitivity of the receivables are evaluated. Other risks related to the cash 
flows from the receivables include:
IV. 2. 1. Early Repayment
In certain circumstances the security can start to amortize early. If this happens the 
investor receives both a monthly payment of principal and interest during the revolving 
period. The credit rating of the issue does not provide any information about whether an 
issue will prepay. It only indicates the probability of receiving a payment in flill by the 
specified maturity date. Therefore, the risk o f prepayment exists even if the issue is of 
AAA rating. Generally, the conditions leading to early amortization are specified as:
* Failure of the servicer to make certain required payments
* Events of bankruptcy or insolvency of the servicer
* Reduction of the amount available for credit enhancement for a certain number 
of consecutive periods (Pitman et. al, 1990).
IV. 2. 2. Late Repayment
Asset backed securities typically have an initial revolving period during which no 
principal is paid, followed by the amortization period where the principal is repaid fully. 
When the revolving period of the security is over the investor faces the risk of payment 
being delayed. This depends on the precise schedule according to which principal
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repayments are made and varies between the issues.
[f there is insufficient cash built up during the accumulation period, then all that has been 
collected will be paid out at the planned maturity date and the balance will amortize. This 
risk is minimized either by a very long accumulation period or by a maturity guarantee 
provided by a bank or by the specification of a legal maturity where the receivables must 
be solved and the trust dissolved.
IV. 3'. Interest Rate Risk (or Market R isk)
Market risk is the possibility of a decline in the market value of a financial instrument 
because of fluctuations in the interest rates. One of the reasons for an institution to 
securitize its assets is to manage the interest rate risk. This is accomplished by removing 
both the receivables and their funding from the balance sheet so that the degree o f 
mismatch is reduced and the interest-rate-sensitivity o f the balance sheet is kept under 
control. It should be noted, however, that this practice does not eliminate the interest rate 
risk from the whole system. It is only transferred to some other sectors or investors who 
are capable and willing to bear this risk.
IV. 4, Liquidity Risk
In general, liquidity risk refers to the possibility that a tradeable financial instrument may 
not realize quickly its full market value. The securitization process has produced a market 
growth in the volume of marketable securities held on banks' books, besides increasing 
the marketability of many bank assets. A danger here is that these trends could produce a 
kind of 'liquidity illusion': they may imply that banks are excessively liquid (Gardener, 
1988).
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However, it should be emphasized that marketable ABS can provide a source of liquidity 
to an individual institution, but not do so to the system as a whole, [n the case of a 
widespread demand for liquidity this need can only be satisfied by cash assets or by 
government securities, if each individual institution attempts to provide liquidity by 
acquiring ABS and thus, by reducing the holdings of government bonds, the liquidity of 
the financial system and its flexibility in periods of stress is likely to deteriorate.
IV. 5. Other Limitations
The advantages of securitization for original lenders, the purchasers of securities and the 
borrowers who benefit in terms of cost reductions have been discussed before. These 
advantages have been considerable and accelerated the growth of various securitized 
markets some of which have been examined. The other side to the securitization coin, 
namely the risks have also been analyzed. However, there are various long term 
disadvantages of securitization which may deserve greater attention before their influence 
is felt in the financial system.
One of such problems is related to the lowering of management's understanding of the 
underlying risks in the ABS schemes. In most cases, this leads almost certainly to a loss 
of management's control. This aspect can be seen most clearly from the point of view of 
the investors and traders of ABS. Some of these securities include complex manipulations 
of cash flows and their risk characteristics may be imperfectly understood both by the 
traders or more critically by the management of the trading firm involved. In short, when 
considering very complex securities one may tend to lose sight o f the basic risk 
considerations and this may result in a significant exposure to loss.
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Finally, the question o f moral hazard or adverse selection is of great importance for the 
efficiency and the stability of the financial system as a whole. As Pennachi (1988) points 
out, the originator would have little incentive to continue to effectively monitor and' 
service the loans once they are securitized which he calls moral hazard problem. This can 
be solved by an appropriate loan sales contract. The problem of adverse selection 
discussed by Greenbaum and Thakor (1977) states that the banks would have an incentive 
to securitize lower quality assets retaining the better in the portfolio. However, the results 
o f their studies have shown that in an environment with no reserve and liquidity 
requirements, no deposit insurance and infonuational asymétries banks, borrowers and 
investors will be indifferent between the two funding modes; credit securitization and 
traditional deposit flinding.
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V. THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE
Asset backed securitization is a fairly recent phenomenon that can be regarded as a 
reflection o f the structural change in the Turkish financial system during I980’s. With 
the liberalization of the interest rates in 1988 the banking system was faced with a sudden 
increase in the cost of funds. The generation of deposits and the placement of these funds 
in order to support new investments has become more and more difficult due to the high* 
interest rates. As a result, large corporations turned to equity financing whereas the rising 
demand of less credible firms for loanable funds increased the credit risk of the banking 
system considerably. This lead banks to look for alternative ways of fiinding and new 
financial instruments.
Consequently, effective asset/liability management became crucial for success in the 
market. Thus, the development of new financial instruments for asset/liability 
management as well as the creation of secondary markets in which they can be traded has 
been the focus o f all the regulatory efforts during I980’s. The organization o f an 
interbank money market, the introduction of certificates of deposits, the development of 
REPO market based on government debt instalments (GDIs) and finally the regulation o f 
asset backed securities are all the reflections ot these efforts.
On the asset management side, the most salient characteristic of this period was an 
increase o f the GDI holdings in the balance sheets of the banks. GDIs also became 
important for the liability management since they provided a basis for REPO transactions. 
REPO market as well as the interbank money market served for the purpose of funding 
the short-term liquidity needs of banks in a wholesale market ( Yeldan and Sak, 1993 ).
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However, the securitization of bank assets should be distinguished from these activities in 
that it provides a tool for tlinding longer term liquidity needs and hence constitutes a 
closer alternative to the traditional deposit funding.
As mentioned before, the regulation o f asset backed securities (ABS) was part of a public 
policy towards the organization of new markets for securitized fimding within the 
banking system. More than that, it was thought as a mechanism to lower the inflation rate 
along with a reduction in the cost o f loanable funds due to the absence of liquidity and 
reserve requirements on the ABS issues. Whether or not it has achieved this objective 
will be discussed in the following chapters.
Before going further, it should be noted that unlike its practice in United States where the 
development of ABS has been a murkct driven process, in the Turkish experience this · 
financial change is induced by governmental action rather than by market forces. The 
impetus came from the problem inherent in the financial system: the crowding out of 
private investment opportunities by the financing requirement of the government. Bank 
financing of the government budget deficits imposed a limit on the financing possibilities 
of the corporations. Thus, one major objective of the process of securitization was to 
overcome this problem by providing a mechanism to convert bank assets into cash and to 
extend the amount of loans provided to the corporate sector.
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V. 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SECURITIZATION IN TURKEY
The legal framework for the securitization of bank loans was drawn with the amendments 
to the Capital Market Law eniicted in June 1992 and the related communique of the 
Capital Market Board (CMB) issued in July 1992. The basics of the foundation of the 
associated General Finance Corporations (GFC) are also prepared with the same 
communique. Only certain types of receivables are included in the legal framework, i.e.. 
fixed assets can not be used as collateral for ABS issues yet. However, with an addition to 
the communique in November 1992, the receivables of Türk Ziraat Bankası that are 
extended through Agricultural Loans Cooperative Society are also specified as assets that 
can be subject to securitization.
V. 1. 1. Definition and Legal Nature
According to the communique, asset backed securities comprise the official securities that 
are registered at the CMB and issued against all of the receivables based on business 
transactions of the issuers defined in the communique or against such receivables that 
are/will be transferred from other parties. Assets that can be subject to securitization are 
specified as: *
* Consumer loans ( including all types of consumer loans; excluding commercial loans)
* Home mortgages
* Receivables arising from financial lease contracts
* Receivables arising from export transactions
* Receivables based on credit sales
* Receivables based on individual agricultural loans
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V. 1.2. issue Basics
Asset backed securities can be issued directly or indirectly by the transfer of the 
receivables. Banks, leasing companies and general finance corporations are specified as 
the issuers. Whereas leasing companies can only use their receivables as collateral, banks 
and GFCs have the right to transfer the above specified types of assets and use them as 
collateral for their issues. However, the transfer of the assets should be in accordance 
with the Law o f Obligations (article 162) and the subsequent transfer o f these assets to 
third parties is also prohibited. The transfer of the assets includes flill recourse to the 
originator. The corporation transferring its assets assumes the burden of any 
delinquencies or defaults and assures the payment of any loss incurred to the bank or 
GFC. The payment guarantee should be based on the whole issue.
The GFCs have to be founded as incorporated corporations with a minimum equity 
capital of 10 billion TL and their operations are limited to the public placement o f the 
ABS based on the assets transferred from third parties. The GFCs are prohibited from any 
type of borrowing except the securitization of the transferred asset portfolio.
In case o f bank issues, the holders of the ABS are secured only by the fact that the lender 
is a banking institution. However, the claims of the holders are not protected under the 
saviftgs deposits insurance fund. On the other hand, issuers other than banks provide 
protection to the security holders along with a compulsory bank guarantee. No ABS can 
be issued without a bank guarantee ( except those issued by banks themselves). Thus, the 
securities originated by GFCs and leasing companies must be placed under a bank 
guarantee and the total asset portfolio used as collateral for each issue should be kept 
below a multiple o f 20 of the equity capital.
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A bank should be assigned as a trustee to pass on the cash flows of the underlying asset 
pool to the issuer. If the originator and the issuer are the same bank then this service 
should be completed by the bank itself. The contract should specify all o f the 
responsibilities of the taistee, the content of the service to be offered and the servicing 
fee. In general, the maximum limit of ABS issues is determined as 9 0 percentoi the total 
value o f the receivables in the underlying asset portfolio at the date of the issue.
V. 1.3. Issue and Sale
Banks, leasing companies and GFCs should apply for permission to the Capital Market 
Board before issuing ABS. Those who are permitted have to be registered at the Board 
where the application is evaluated. If the securities indenture does not include sufficient 
information or the information is found to be misleading the Board may cancel the 
registration to protect the potential investors. CMB also has the right to cancel the 
application completely or partly if the assets backing the issue are not sufficient as 
collateral.
For the accepted applications a registration fee consisting of 0.3 percent o f the whole- 
issue should be placed in a special fund at the Board.
The sales of the ABS should be realized through public placement where they can be sold 
either on discount basis or on floating rates of interest. The legal framework enables the 
issuers to determine freely the discount (or interest) rate and the payment schedule 
provided that the maturity characteristics and cash flows of the underlying receivables are 
matched closely with the proposed schedule. ABS are freely traded in secondary markets 
and those that could not be sold during the sales period are canceled within 6 days.
39
V. 2. COMPARISON OF THE U.S. AND TURKISH SECURITIZATION
STRUCTURES
After having examined the legal framework of the securitization process in United States 
and Turkey it would be helphil to stress on the similarities as well as on the differences of 
both structures.
The communique prepared by the CMB is actually designed to include all parties 
involved in the securitization process similar to the practices in U.S.A and other 
countries. In the Turkish practice, the banks, leasing companies are specified as 
originators. The GFCs are designed instead of the special purpose vehicle which enables, 
the issuer to take off the receivables from its balance sheet. The guarantee for the ABS 
issue is provided by a bank if the issuer is a non-bank corporation, i.e. bank acts as an 
insurer. The Turkish structure also includes a trustee which can either be the bank 
originating and issuing the ABS or a bank assigned by the GFC and the corporation 
transferring its receivables -if a GFC acts as the issuer (the latter did not happen until now 
in Turkey). However, parties such as credit enhancer and also the rating agencies are 
absent in Turkish market although they are caicial for the success and efficient 
fiinctioning of any securitization scheme.
It is obvious that with these deficiencies, the current practice of ABS in Turkey represents · 
a different picture than that of developed countries. First of all, no GFCs with the 
purpose of transferring the receivables of non-bank corporations have been founded until 
now. The result was that the banks issued securities [backed by their own assets except a 
few instances where they transferred receivables from leasing companies.
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With the absence o f any GFC acting as a special purpose corporation no assets could be 
removed from the balance sheets o f the banks. Thus one major benefit o f securitization 
was eliminated: to achieve more favorable debt/equity ratios...
Furthermore, the credit support used to protect the issue against failures takes the form of 
a bank guarantee. Some other mechanisms are also included to eliminate any risks· 
associated with the portfolio of the underlying receivables. One of them is the limit 
imposed by the Board that sets a boundary on the issue backed by specific assets 
(maximum 90 % of the assets can be securitized). This enables a protection o f 10 % or 
more against any defaults or delinquencies. This resembles the method of over­
collateralization where the amount of receivables placed by the originator in the ABS 
exceeds the par value of the issue. The amount of over-collateralization differs with the 
credit risk of the underlying receivables and is determined by the Board.
Another measure to match the cash flow of the portfolio with the payment schedule o f the 
securities is provided by limiting the period between these dates to 30-45 days. Still, it is 
obvious that the techniques used for guaranteeing the issue fall short of those that are 
used in U.S. market where a pool insurance policy is often established to meet any losses 
resulting from the failures in the repayment of the issue. Some external credit support 
mechanisms are almost an integral part of the structure that usually take the form of 
letters of credit, guaranteed investment contract, interest rate swaps or repurchase 
agreements (they were discussed in previous chapters). The Turkish practice has not 
reached this diversity in terms of the techniques used for credit enhancement.
There are several reasons of the absence of an effective credit enhancement scheme in 
Turkey. The first and the most important one is the lack of a rating system on the
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securities originated by Turkish financial institutions or corporations. There is no 
mechanism to evaluate the credit risk of these institutions and to provide continuos 
information about the changes in their credit status. Without the existence of the rating 
agencies it is difficult to specify the level of credit enhancement o f the issue based on the 
analysis of the historical performance, cash generation sufficiency of the underlying 
receivables and the likelihood of any defaults.
Rating agencies play an important role in the process o f securitization in United States 
since they permit the securities to be rated higher than its originator in most cases, if there 
is sufficient credit support on the issue. Thus, the pricing o f the securities is based on the 
evaluation of the portfolio of receivables subject to securitization and the credit risk o f the 
originator. This task is performed by the rating agencies.
However, in our system the lack of these institutions prevents the development of an 
effective and efficient pricing mechanism that incorporates the risk/retum characteristics 
of different financial instruments, the investor preferences and the riskiness o f the 
originating institutions. As a result, the prices of the securities seem to appear within 
specific limits regardless of the credit characteristics of the issuers and the quality of the 
issue. The same is also true for ABS in Turkey. Since there are no rating agencies to 
provide feedback to the pricing mechanism the banks and other issuers are allowed to 
determine freely the interest rate applied to their ABS issues. In practice however, there 
are some limitations imposed on them by the CMB such as specification of some limits, 
for interest rates of different maturities. Therefore, the resulting interest rates realized on 
various ABS issues were more or less the same for each maturity as if the originators 
were of the same risk class.
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Actually, some of the banks In Turkey that have issued ABS went bankrupt today and 
this is again in conflict with the current regulation in United States that requires the issuer 
(SPV) to be bankruptcy remote.
This requirement is set to enable the isolation o f the credit risk o f the originator from the 
quality of the ABS. In that way, the credit strength of the receivables can be isolated from 
the originator’s overall risk profile. On the other hand, since the assets are not removed 
from the balance sheet in the Turkish practice, the risk of the assets subject to 
securitization and the credit risk of the bank can not be separated from each other 
completely. Thus, the process o f securitization transfers the portfolio risk of the 
underlying receivables from the bank to the potential investors and ftirthermore, the risk 
of bankruptcy of the originator remains unchanged.
The above mentioned drawbacks in the evaluation and the elimination of the associated 
risks along with a pricing mechanism that fails to reflect the risk/return characteristics of 
the securities seem to be the major causes of the differences in the application of 
securitization process in United States and Turkey. The next chapter will provide more 
detailed information about the growth of the ABS market despite these differences and 
try to evaluate the current securitization experience.
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V. 3. EVALUATION OF THE CURJIENT SECURITIZATION PRACTICE
IN TURKEY
The recent increase in the new issue volume of asset backed securities has demonstrated a 
great acceptance of similar structures in the Turkish banking sector. The volume of ABS 
issued to date has reached 69.57 trillion TL (with respect to December 1993) that 
constitutes 43.58 % of total time deposits (excluding foreign exchange deposits). Taking 
into consideration that the same figure was only 1.7 % in August 1992 where ABS were 
first issued in Turkey one can easily evaluate the sizable growth that the market has 
experienced since then (Appendix 1).
The assets that have been subject to securitization vary from consumer loans to credit 
card receivables and from agricultural loans to receivables based on lease contracts.
Table 1 shows the volume of ABS for each of these classifications;
Table 1. Classification of Asset Types
A s s e t  t y p e • A m o u n t  (1000 TL ) P e rc e n ta g e  ( % ) '
Financial Lease C o n tra c ts 287,562,751 0.32
C o n s u m e r Loans 49,233,509,177 55.48
H o m e  M o rtg a g e s 11,461,863,614 12.92
C a r Loans 11,379,765,916 12.82
C re d it  C a rd  R ece ivab les 7 ,069,143,778 7.97
O t h e r  R eceivab les 296,827,700 0.33
A g ric u ltu ra l Loans 9 ,005,986,708 10.15
T o ta l 88 ,734,659,644 100
Source: CMB Reports, February 1994.
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As can be seen, consumer loans rank first with 55.48 % in the portfolio of receivables 
backing ABS issues. However this figure does not reflect the actual share of consumer 
loans in the portfolio since some banks did not differentiate in terms of car loans or home 
mortgages when they are providing the associated figures to the Board.
The classification of ABS according to the maturities is provided in Table 2. It can be 
observed that most of the issues are concentrated around the maturity of 3 months and 
54.51 % o f the ABS have a maturity of 6 months or shorter. Thus, the current tendency is 
to issue short-term securities backed by largely on consumer loans.
Table 2. classification According to Maturities
Maturity Amount of Issue (% } Cumulative Vo
(m illion  TL)
..................-  ··« ‘•-- ...... - ..... ......... ....  ........ ..... . -  .........
1 m o n th 7,406,024 9.51 9.51 .
2 m o n th s 6,480,046 8.32 17.82
3 m o n th s 10,162,499 13.04 30.87
4 m o n th s 5,963,150 7.65 38.52
5 m o n th s 5,450,701 7.00 45.52
6 m o n th s 7,000,771 8.99 54.51
7 m o n th s 5,035,893 6 4 6 60.97
8 m o n th s 4,781,889 6 Tl4 67.11
9 m o n th s 5,439,372 6^98‘ ;^'-';'"^'^‘- ’ '- '; '7 4 ;d 9 ;^ .... '
10 m o n th s 5,481,853 7.04 81.13
11 m o n th s 5,681,063 7.29 88.42
12 m o n th s 8,005,187 10.28 98.69
12 + 1,017,243 1 ‘31 ib o ^ o o
T o ta l 77,905,691 100.00 .
Source: CMB Reports, February 1994.
It can hardly be argued that the enormous growth in the ABS market can be attributed 
solely to the benefits that securitization offers to various parties involved. Instead, in the 
Turkish experience a single driving force seems to be dominant; the absence o f  reserve 
and liquidity requirements on A B S  issues.
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Since the deposits are subject to such requirements that are reflected as increased costs of 
capital ABS have become increasingly popular for the banks and provided them with a 
mechanism to collect fiinds at relatively lower costs.
Another characteristic o f the ABS market is the lack of liquidity. Although ABS issues 
have reached a significant size, almost all of the issues are originated by banks and issued 
against their own receivables. The issues have usually been placed to a few major 
investors. Hence, a competitive market for ABS could not be reached. As a result, the 
difference between the deposits and ABS became less clearcut for both the banks and the 
investors. It is the purpose o f the next sections to study various effects of asset backed 
securitization in a formal framework.
V. 3. 1. Effect o f Asset Backed Securities on Deposits
IV. 3. 1. 1. A Graphical Representation
Perhaps the most important effect of securitization has been on the volume o f deposits 
that once was the primary source of funds for banking sector. The traditional deposit 
funding has increasingly been replaced by securitization, especially during 1993. As 
explained before, this is largely due to the inability (or unwillingness) of the issuers to 
differentiate ABS from deposits. The volume of total time deposits (excluding foreign 
exchange deposits) has increased by 31.42 % during 1993 to become 159.61 trillion TL. 
The comparison o f the same figure of the previous year (47.76 %) reflects the slowdown 
more clearly (Appendix 1). The share of the deposits in total liabilities of the banks 
decreased from its value of 55.5 % in December 1992 to 47.9 % in November 1993 "7.
'^CUT. 1993. Annual Report, p. 61.
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Figuce 4. Total Time Deposits vs A sset Backed Securities
TOTAL HIVE DEPOSITS VSL ABS
Months (1992 -1993)
T im e  D. --------A B S
Figure 4 represents the volume of asset backed securities against total deposits including 
only different classes of time deposits (savings, commercial corporate, official and other 
corporations’ deposits and the certificates of deposits). The slowdown in the growth o f 
deposits, especially in the second quarter of 1993, can be easily identified from the graph.
During the same period as well as the third and fourth quarters of 1993 ABS have shown 
a steady and considerable increase. The percentage changes in the volume of different 
classes o f deposits and ABS for each month of 1992-1993 period is provided in 
Appendix 3. These graphical representations provide a better idea about the decline in the 
growth of deposits and the expansion of ABS issues (note that the percentage change was 
-0.63 in May 1993).
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The most remarkable increases have been realized during May, August and December 
1993 due to the large issues of Emlakbank, T.C. Ziraat Bankası and T. İş Bankası backed 
by home loans, agricultural loans and consumer loans of these banks, respectively.
Although the figures seem to reflect a direct influence of ABS on the deposits collected 
by banks, it should be noted that the rate of increase in deposits (especially savings 
deposits) is also closely related to the return characteristics of alternative financial 
instniments. The decline in the volume of total time deposits that has been observed 
during 1993 can be attributed to the widespread use of new alternative instruments such 
as REPO and mutual funds in that period and to the fact that the return of deposits fell 
short of the returns provided by these instruments. The tax rate applied on the interest 
income earned from deposits has been high during 1993. This channeled a large portion 
o f savings away from deposits to these alternative instruments.
Furthermore, the increase in interest rates during the same period has been lower than the 
rate o f inflation. Thus, the banks were able to turn to foreign markets in order to meet a 
considerable portion o f their financing needs at lower costs and this represents another 
reason that contributed to the reduction in TL deposits.
V. 3, 1.2. Cost Analysis
It has already been stated that the fundamental cause of the decline in the volume o f 
deposits in recent years was the difference between the costs of deposits and ABS which· 
arc not subject to legal requirements. This difference (if calculated as annual weighted 
average cost) was as wide as 35 % at the beginning where ABS were first issued and 
fluctuated between 10-20 % since then. Table 3 shows the associated figures.
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Table 3. The Comparison of the Costs o f Deposits vs. ABS
ABS DEPOSITS DIFFERENCE
1992
1993
8 5 4 .7 9 % 9 0 .8 5 % 3 6 .0 6 %
9 6 9 .2 7 % 9 1 .1 2 % 2 1 .8 5 %
10 7 0 .2 9 % 9 1 .1 1 % 2 0 .8 2 %
11 7 2 .3 3 % 9 2 .8 9 % 2 0 .5 6 %
12 . .. 7 0 .9 9 % ......... .......... 9 3 .2 3 % ..................................... 2 2 ,2 4 %
1 7 1 .5 9 % 9 2 .6 9 % 2 1 .1 0 %
2 7 1 .7 7 % 8 8 .6 2 % ■ ■^16.85%
3 7 3 .3 0 % 8 6 .0 8 % 1 2 .7 8 %
4 7 4 .8 0 % 8 4 !9 9 % i o ; i 9 %
5 7 0 .6 3 % 8 4 .4 2 % 1 3 .7 9 %
6 7 5 .0 6 % 8 4 .1 3 % .... ........? .Q 7 %
7 7 3 .0 7 % 8 4 .1 4 % 1 1 .0 7 %
8 7 6 .6 2 % 8 3 .9 1 % 7 .2 9 %
9 7 4 .6 7 % 8 3 .3 4 % • 8 .6 7 %
10 7 2 .1 2 % 8 5 .9 9 % ............  . 1 3 .8 7 %
11 7 3 .5 0 % 8 4 .0 6 % 1 0 .5 6 %
12 7 3 .6 1 % 8 3 .9 9 % 1 0 .3 8 %
A detailed cost analysis of both financing techniques is provided in Appendix 4 a. and b. 
for year 1992 only, however the calculations are the same for year 1993 with the 
appropriate modification of weights. Table 4 illustrates the calculation of the cost of. 
deposits for December 1992.
The most important component in their cost structures comes from capital, reserve and 
liquidity requirements which account for 5 %, 7.5-16 % and 30 % ot total deposits, 
respectively.® These requirements reduce the amount of usable funds to a considerable 
extent, thus increase the total cost of hinds for the banking system.
HeCn r, AniuKil Report,
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Table 4. Illustration of the Cost of Deposits for December 1992
1 m o n th 3 m o n th s 6 m o n th s 1 y e a r
1 A m o u n t  o f  D e p o s it  T L 1000 1000 1000 1000
2 C apita l R e q u ire m e n t 50 50 50 50
3 R e s e rve  R e q u ire m e n t 160 75 75 75
4 L iq u id ity  R e q u ire m e n t 300 300 300 300
5 T o ta l 510 425 425 425
6 Usable  F un ds (1 -5 ) 490 575 575 575
7 In te re s t  Rate 0.576 0.691 0.695 0.742
8 In te re s t  on 48 173 348 742
M a tu r ity
(1 * 7 )/ M a tu rity
9 In te re s t  on  GDI 0.8676 0.8676 0.8676 0.8676
10 R e tu rn  o n  L iq u id  A s s e ts 22 65 130 260
(4 * 9 )/ M a tu rity
11 T o ta l C o s t (8 -9 ) 26 108 217 482
12 C o s t o f  Usable F u n d s  (1 1 /6 ) 0.0537 0.1873 0.3780 0.8378
13 A n n u a l E f fe c t iv e  C o s t
14 Weighted Average Cost
0.8732
0.9323
0.9870 0.8989 0.8378
On the other hand, ABS enjoy the benefits provided them by the legal framework and are 
able'to reduce the effective cost of usable tlinds by a great amount. Surely, this is the 
main reason of their rapid and wide acceptance by the banking sector. Table 5 provides 
the calculation o f the cost of asset backed securities.
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Table 5. Illustration of the Cost o f ABS for December 1992
1 m o n th 3 m o n th s 6 m o n th s 1 y e a r
Initial Amount of ABS 1000 1000 1000 1000
D is c o u n t R ate 0.63 0.71 0.73 0.78
D is c o u n t R ate  n e t  o f  Ta xe s 0 .5626 0.6340 0.6519 0.6965
In te re s t  o n  M a tu r ity 47 159 326 697
R e g is tra tio n  Fee 3 3 3 3
T o ta l C o s t 50 162 329 700
cost of Usable Funds 0.0499 0.1615 0.3289 0.6995
A n n u a l E f fe c t iv e  C o st 0 .7934 0.8201 0.7661 0.6995
weighted Average Cost 0.7099
The cost figures o f both alternatives are based on the weighted averages of their annual 
effective costs. Annual effective costs are calculated for each maturity class : I month, 3. 
months, 6 months and 1 year. In the calculation of the cost of ABS, first maturity class (I 
month) includes ABS with a maturity of 1-2 months, second class (3 months) includes 
ABS with a maturity of 3-5 months, third class consists of ABS with maturities o f 6-9 
months and finally I-year maturity class contains ABS with maturities 10-12 months. 
This is done to facilitate the computations as well as to provide a more effective 
comparison with deposits in terms of these maturities. The weights in the calculations are 
assigned on the basis of the volume of each maturity class in the total volume of deposits 
(or asset backed securities).
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Figure 5 provides a better idea about the fluctuations in the cost structure of both 
alternatives for the period 1992-1993.
Figure 5. The Cost Comparison o f  Deposits vs. A sset Backed Securities
A COST COMPARISON OF ABS VS DEPOSITS
10.00%
0.00% -f- -I------- l·-
00 0> O r- CN| r- ( N r O ^ d ’ L n t O r s C O O Or-
Months (1992-1993)
CN
A B S ” D e p o s it
[t can easily be seen from the graph that the weighted average annual effective cost for 
ABS lie far below those of time deposits throughout the time period of 1992-1993. This 
provides a further support to the explanation of the sudden growth of the ABS market.
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V. 3. 2. Effect o f Asset Backed Securities on Interest Rates
In the light of the findings of the previous section one can conclude that ABS provide a 
low-cost source of tiinds to banks and leave them with an ability to pass on this cost 
difference to their investors in terms of increased interest rates applied to these ABS 
issues. Taking into account that only certain types of assets can be subject to 
securitization (consumer loans, home mortgages, agricultural loans etc.) the cost 
advantages of ABS issues go only to those banks that have such assets in their balance 
sheets. Therefore, the concern in the banking sector was that such a situation would create 
an unfair competition between the banks that have the opportunity to issue ABS and 
those that do not. As a result, the latter would inevitably increase the interest rates on 
deposits to compete with the cost advantages offered by the ABS to their competitors. In 
the long am this would inevitably lead to an interest rate war in the banking system.
Actually, this was the case for a short period of time that includes the last quarter of 1992 
where the ABS were first issued. The interest rates on deposits have increased for all 
maturities9. However, such a trend could not be observed in 1993. The interest rates 
remained relatively stable for maturities of 1-3 months whereas an increasing trend was 
observed for maturities of 6 months and one year. Remembering that the ABS issues 
were largely concentrated on short-term maturities, this creates a conflict with the above 
mentioned concerns o f the banking sector.
It can not be ignored that ABS have a potential of exerting an upward pressure on interest 
rate^. But the reason that this pressure was not felt so seriously until now was the interest 
rate policy o f the government that was in effect during 1993. The aim was to reduce
Cin', Quarterly lUillotin, IV.
53
short-term interest rates to lighten the debt burden of the government in the short run and 
to spread it to the long run by increasing long-temi interest rates applied on GDI’s that 
showed a constant decrease for 3-6 months maturity starting in the last quarter of 1992 
and a steady rise during 1992-93 for maturities of 9 months and 1 year (Appendix 5).
One, final consideration regarding the interest rates is related to the effect o f ABS on the 
rates applied on corporate loans. In the beginning, asset backed securitization was thought 
as a mechanism to provide banking institutions with a new and low-cost source o f funds 
which, in turn, would extend the volume of loans provided to the corporate sector by a. 
considerable amount. The aim and the hope was that banks would reflect the cost 
advantages of ABS to the cost of credits as well and reduce the cost of loanable funds 
which have traditionally been high. However, it is difficult to evaluate whether or not this 
objective has been reached since the data about the credit interest rates provided to the 
corporate sector is hard to obtain from the banks. But the current practice shows that the 
funds collected through ABS issues backed largely by consumer loans are usually used 
again in the creation and extension of such loans instead of channeling them to the 
corporate sector.
V. 3. 3. Effect o f Asset Backed Securities on Monetary Policies
The effect of securitization on the monetary policy followed by the Central Bank is 
related to the absence of reserve and liquidity requirements on ABS. Banks were able to 
avoid the control mechanism of Central Bank through the device of legal requirements. 
With these characteristics ABS have been rapidly adopted by banks reaching a volume of 
about 69 trillion at the end of December 1993. The same figure was about 10 trillion at 
the end of 1992 where ABS were first issued. The share of ABS in total time deposits
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was 8.6 % at that time. However, since then this ratio has increased by a considerable 
amount, reaching 43.58 % at the end of 1993 (Appendix 1).
The sudden expansion of the market raised some reasonable concerns about the 
effectiveness o f the monetary control of the Central Bank. The amount of funds that 
would otherwise be kept in Central Bank through reserve requirements (7.5-16 % plus 5 
% free reserves) reached 8.75-14.7 trillion TL today and furthermore, the GDI holdings 
as a result o f liquidity requirement (30 %) are reduced by an amount of 21 trillion TL. 
This eliminated the opportunity of the government to finance the budget deficit through 
debt instruments to a great extent. The lack of these legal requirements left the Central 
Bank with the single alternative of monetization and increased the amount of monetary 
reserves. The result was an upward pressure on the money supply that is and has always 
been a major problem that the Central Bank had to cope with.
According to the recent announcement of the government dated April 5th, 1994 also ABS 
have been subject to liquidity requirement. Although the practice did not start yet, the 
effort is justified in the sense that it would eliminate part of the negative effects of the 
ABS on the monetary control o f the Central Bank.
V. 3. 4. Macroeconomic Effects of Asset Backed Securities
The securitization process in Turkey was subject to some criticisms regarding the nature 
of the assets to be securitized. Consumer loans are perceived as being one of the riskiest 
receivables and are argued to have relatively high delinquency and default rates by some, 
bankers. It was also argued that the allowance of banks to issue ABS against consumer 
loans induced them to extend the amount of these loans further. Such a tendency would
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stimulate the expenditures on consumption as well as the total demand on the goods 
market which, in turn, would exert a negative impact on inflation. In short, securitization 
o f consumer loans would have an inflationary effect resulting from an excess demand in 
the market.
While discussions on this issue continue in the banking sector, studies have been 
conducted to highlight the macroeconomic effects of ABS. According to the Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model developed by Yeldan and Sak (1993) consumer loans 
have been found to have an inflationary effect on the economy as a whole. Effectively, 
consumer loans crowd out the loans provided to the corporate sector which were already 
crowded out by GDI’s. ABS issues against consumer loans have shown a dampening 
effect on the inflationary impact of the consumer loans in the.system. This was the result 
o f an increase in loanable Hinds and a decrease in their costs. Nevertheless, the net result 
was still inflationary.
Keeping these in mind, it can be argued that the timing of the regulation on asset backed 
securities was not as appropriate as one would expect. It came out in a period where the 
government was concentrating its efforts on the reduction of the inflation rate. Hence, the 
current practice of securitization eliminated the impact of these efforts to great extent and 
left the government with ineffective policies.
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V. 4. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
V. 4. I . Nature o f the Assets
The current regulation on ABS specifies consumer loans, home mortgages, lease 
contracts, export receivables, receivables on credit sales and agricultural loans as the 
assets that can be subject to securitization. The practice has mainly concentrated on the 
ABS backed by consumer loans, followed by home mortgages and agricultural loans. 
Except a few small issues lease contracts and receivables on credit sales are not used as 
eollateral. The main reason is that the Turkish ABS were almost totally originated and 
issued by banks. Banks, being dominant in this new market, adopted the process rapidly 
as a mechanism to obtain low-cost source of funds. The market expanded especially for 
ABS backed by consumer loans which have an inflationary impact on the economy.
The point is that assets with a negative effect on the economic growth are allowed to be 
used as collateral whereas others stimulating production and economic growth are 
precluded with the regulation. In the current situation of the economy it is important to 
create a mechanism that would provide the corporate sector with less costly fluids. 
However, as discussed before, the current practice of ABS crowds out the credits 
provided to the corporate sector and also has an inflationary effect.
The solution to this problem would be the to extend the content of the regulation to 
include loans provided to sectors that play a significant role in the economy as a whole,, 
such as industry, tourism and exports. Only then would securitization enable the 
stimulation o f the economic growth and create an effective mechanism to cope with 
inflation.
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Besides changing the nature of the assets, it is also important to allow the participation of 
non-bank financial institutions as well as other corporations to the process of 
securitization. The following section would discuss two potential areas where this may be 
accomplished: the leasing and factoring sectors.
V. 4. 2. The Leasing Sector
The financial lease contracts seem to be especially suitable for ABS in that they have 
certain and predictable cash flows of a sufficient size. Furthermore, information about 
their historical performance is readily available through audit companies. The assets have 
a sufficiently long maturity (2 years on average) and the payments on receivables are 
followed very carefully (the contract is terminated if the lessee does not pay within 30 
days after a protest).
Unlike consumer loans that are based on credits provided to medium/high income groups 
of consumers with relatively high delinquency and default rates, the receivables on lease 
contracts are based on physical goods or property (such as a ship, airplane or building). 
There is also a pre-specified payment stream involved in the contract and the receivables’ 
are guaranteed further by a letter of guarantee or a mortgage obligation. Thus, a lease 
company sets forth the good or property as well as all the associated guarantee on the 
receivables as a collateral for ABS issues.
Although they constitute a great potential for ABS market the leasing companies could 
not extend their share in the market for various reasons. One of them is the requirement 
o f a bank guarantee that should accompany the ABS issue. Taking into account that 
leasing companies are allowed to issue bonds with longer maturities and in larger
58
denominations than ABS without a bank guarantee, the insistence of the Board on that 
requirement is hardly understandable.
Another reason of their absence in the market is the administrative and bureaucratic 
burden of the securitization process when compared to bond issues. Expenses incurred 
besides the cost of interest include the commissions on underwriting, representation and 
conservation, the commission paid for bank guarantee, various taxes and finally the 
commission paid to the Board for registration. These compulsory expenses increase the 
final· cost of securitization considerably and make it less advantageous when compared to 
other financing alternatives. Unless these problems could be solved with appropriate 
modifications in the communique one would hardly expect to see leasing companies 
acting in the ABS market.
V. 4. 3. Factoring Sector
Another potential area where ABS can effectively be used is the factoring sector. The 
securitization of receivables based on export activities is already allowed by the related 
communique of the CMB. However, there are some problems associated with the practice 
of it. The regulation states that assets biised only on export transactions could be 
securitized. In a typical transaction, the exporting firm accepts receivables of the foreign 
company (importer) and then sells these receivables to a factoring firm. In that case, the 
factoring firm assumes the credit risk of the importer which is totally unknown in most 
cases. To avoid this risk, the receivables are sold to another factoring firm operating in- 
the country of the importer. Thus, the credit risk and all the receivables are transferred to 
that firm which has enough information about the credit status of the importer.
5‘)
It is obvious that this transaction leaves no room for ABS since the receivables are 
already transferred to another factoring firm. It would also be in conflict with the 
principles o f securitization if ABS were issued against the receivables instead of their sate 
to another factoring firms since in that case the issue would be backed by assets the risks 
of which are extremely difficult to assess. Given this situation, ABS are not applicable to 
the factoring sector currently. However, the content of the regulation could be extended to 
include domestic factoring transactions. In that way, the receivables of a highly liquid 
nature that usually belong to the corporate sector could be turned into cash and the 
financing needs of the industrial corporations could be partially solved through this new 
financing technique.
Both for leasing and factoring sector the major concern is the requirement of a bank 
guarantee. This increases the cost of securitization scheme and hence constitutes a barrier 
for these firms as well as other non-financial corporations to enter the market. Without 
their existence in the securities market there would be no incentives for the foundation of 
GFCs acting as special purpose vehicles to provide off-balance sheet financing which is 
at the heart of any securitization scheme.
To eliminate the dominance of banks in the ABS market and to allow the participation of 
the above mentioned corporations and many others it would be appropriate to rearrange 
the bank guarantee condition. It should not be based on the total issue volume, rather, 
depending on the risk of the underlying receivables the guarantee should be limited to 
some specific percentage of the issue. Of course, this would not mean that no other 
control mechanisms should be implemented. Some of these control mechanisms that 
should be incorporated in any securitization scheme include;
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* the condition of being audited before the registration
* the condition of providing relevant information to the Capital Market Board about the 
historical performance .delinquency and default rates) o f the assets
* the respecification of the limits on the total value of the issue that can be backed by a 
certain pool of assets (a careful analysis of the CMB to determine the level of over­
collateralization should be essential)
* the condition of having shown profitability for 2 or more consecutive years before the 
application
Moreover, to facilitate the foundation of general financial corporations, especially for the 
firms in the corporate sector, the minimum amount of the equity capital that is required 
should be lowered (currently specified as 10 billion by the communique). The transfer of 
the assets should be restructured such that it does not include any or at least partial 
recourse to the originator. The payment guarantee of the originator should be totally 
eliminated or at least should be reduced to a level that is specified according to the risk of 
the assets in the underlying portfolio. In the latter case, an effective evaluation of the risks 
is essential which creates another problem.
A final adjustment that is essential for the success of the securitization schemes is the 
inclusion of rating agencies in the structure. After the extension of the assets to include 
corporate loans or factoring receivables with relatively short maturities (90 days on 
average) it will be much more difficult to analyze the riskiness of these various assets 
underlying ABS issues. A mechanism is required to assess the sufficiency of cash flows 
generated by the assets, to evaluate the likelihood of any defaults and to examine the 
historical performance of the underlying receivables. The investors should be made aware 
of the risk/return characteristics of each ABS issue so that they can differentiate between 
various investment alternatives.
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Of course, the inclusion of the rating agencies into the legal framework is easier said than 
done. Like many other new mechanisms and financial innovations, the implications for 
implementation should be carefully identified and the associated pros and cons should be 
analyzed by regulatory authorities. These and other adjustments would provide a stronger 
basis for asset backed securitization and increase the participation in the market. 
Furthermore, the new regulation about the liquidity requirement would eliminate the cost 
advantages of ABS for the banks and create a more competitive environment for this 
instrument among other financing alternatives.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Securitization o f receivables has achieved a size and diversity to make it one of the most 
important developments in the financial system in the United States. The expansion of 
securitized markets in 1980’s has to some extent been driven by special, local market 
forcés such as increased costs of capital for the financial sector and an intense 
competition among different financial institutions.
in a properly structured securitization scheme the underlying receivables are removed 
from the balance sheet of the originator which protects the investor from any changes in 
the quality of the issuer. Additional credit enhancement is usually provided in order to 
reduce the default risk of the ABS and to persuade the investors that the risk/return 
characteristics of the security is acceptable.
The advantages of securitization that have been stressed include protection from interest 
rate risk, increased liquidity for original lenders and for investors, a more efficient flow of 
capital from investors to borrowers and finally a new and less expensive source of funds 
for original lenders. These benefits have been considerable and accelerated the growth of 
the markets in these securities which can be used as a ftirther evidence o f the global trend 
toward securitization.
There are, of course, some problems which securitization shares with other innovative 
and new methods of financing. One is related to the legal and accounting complexities of 
the structure. The resulting risk exposure may be vague and unpredictable. Furthermore, 
the risks inherent in the structure can not be totally eliminated from the system, only 
transferred to some other sectors.
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As the boundaries between the capital markets become increasingly difficult to define the 
globalization of the market-place became also more obvious. This globalization has 
further contributed to the spread of securitized instruments into domestic markets. The 
Turkish financial market has also taken its part on this increasing trend towards 
securitization. However, unlike the experience of United States where securitization 
evolved as a result of market forces this process is induced by governmental action in the 
Turkish context. The aim was to provide the financial markets with a new, low-cost 
source o f funds that would provide liquidity and improve alloCational efficiency of the 
financial system as well as to pass on the benefits of securitization to ultimate borrowers 
in terms of lower credit costs.
It can be stated that the regulation has reached its objective of providing low-cost source 
of funds, especially to the banking sector which is dominant in this new market. 
However, this is accomplished at the expense of a traditional flinction of banks : deposit 
collection. ABS are rapidly adopted by banks as a mechanism to escape legal 
requirements that provided a considerable cost advantage over deposits. As a result, 
deposits have been increasingly replaced by this new funding alternative.
The new practice of making ABS subject to liquidity requirements would eliminate their 
cost advantage and perhaps reduce the negative impact they exert on deposits, as well as 
on the monetary control mechanisms of the Central Bank. Starting from a very near 
futufe, asset backed securities would be forced to stand on their own fee t; they will have 
to stand the critical examination of the market-place in terms of the benefits they offer to 
the originators, issuers and investors over comparable financing alternatives. Like any 
other innovation, if they add real value they will be adopted widely also in the future.
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To facilitate their success in the market and to reach the objective of improving the 
efficiency of the financial system, the participation of many different sectors in the 
process of securitization is essential. Leasing and factoring companies constitute a good 
potential for the iisset backed securities market. Non-financial corporations can also be 
attracted to the process of securitization if the content o f the regulation is extended to 
include loans granted to corporate sector for investments in industry, exports or tourism. 
Other adjustments that should take place include the credit enhancement schemes 
alternative to bank guarantee and consideration of rating agencies that will help to shape, 
investor preferences.
With these and other modifications of the stnicture the reliance of the corporate sector on 
bank loans can be reduced by offering a new and effective method of financing that 
provides liquidity. With the participation of different financial and non-financial 
corporations to the process a more effective ftinctioning of primary and secondary 
securities markets can be enabled. The macroeconomic effects of this will be an increase 
in the investments on sectors that stimulate production and dampen the inflation which, in 
turn, will contribute to the growth of the whole economy.
65
APPENDICES
66
APPENDIX 1.
all values fo r deposits are based on the CBT Q uarterly Bulletin.1994
' cum ulative sum o f ABS issues
based on the figures on CMB Monthly Bulletin 1992-1993
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A PPEN D IX  2. GRAPHS O F SAVINGS D EPO SITS AND C E R T IF IC A T E S  O F DEPO SITS
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A P P EN D IX  2. G RA PH S O F SAVIN G S D EP O SITS AN D CD s vs. A S S E T  BA CKED  SECU RITIES
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A P P EN D IX  3. P ER C EN TA G E C H A N C ES IN T H E  VOLUM E O F D EPO SITS (1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 )
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A PPEN D IX  4.a. CA LCU LA TIO N  OF TH E C O S T S  O F D EP O SITS
COST OF DEPOSITS
AUGUST (1992)
SEPTEMBER (1992)
1 m onth months
1 A m ount o f Deposit t l 1000 1000
2 Capital Requirem ent 50 50
3 Reserve Requirem ent 160 75
4 Liquidity Requirem ent 300 300
5 Total 510 425
6 Usable Funds (1-5) 490 575
7 Interest Rate · 0.571 0.684
8 Interest on Maturity 48 171
(1 •7)/M aturity
9 Interest on GDI · · 0.8752 0.8752
10 Return on Liquid Assets 22 66
(4*9)/M aturity
11 Total Cost (8-9) 26 105
12 Cost o f  Usable Funds (11/ 6 ) 0.0525 0.1832
13 Annual E ffe ctive  Cost 0.8469 0.9601
14 W eighted Average Cost*** 0.9085
m onths
1000
50
75
300
425
575
0.685
343
0.8752
131
211
0.3673
0.8696
1 year
1000
50
75
300
425
575
0.741
741
0.8752
263
478
0.8321
0.8321
1 m onth 3 m onths 6m onths 1 year
1 A m ount o f Deposit J L
2 Capital Requirem ent
3 Reserve Requirem ent
4 Liquidity Requirem ent
5 Total
6 Usable Funds (1-5)
7 Interest Rate ·
8 Interest on Maturity
(1 *7)/Maturity
9 Interest on GDI · *
10 Return on Liquid Assets
(4*9)/M aturity
11 Total Cost (8-9 )
12 Cost o f Usable Funds (11/ 6 )
13 Annual Effective  Cost
14 Weighted Average Cost**’"
1000 1000 1000 1000
50 50 50 50
160 75 75 75
300 300 300 300
510 425 425 425
490 575 575 575
0.571 0.681 0.683 0.739
48 170 342 739
0.8644 0.8644 0.8644 0.8644
22 65 130 259
26 105 212 480
0.0530 0.1833 0.3684 0.8342
0.8585
0.9112
0.9608 0.8726 0.8342
CBT, Q uarterly Bulletin, 1993 IV.
• * re fe r to  Appendix 5 fo r calculations
m aturity total in the total volum e o f  deposits at th e  end o f year 1992
based on Bankalarımız -92, Annual Report.
A PPEN D IX  4.a. CALCULATION OF THE COSTS OF D E P O SITS
COST OF DEPOSITS
OCTOBER (1992)
NOVEMBER (1992)
1 Am ount o f Deposit J L
2 Capital Requirem ent
3 Reserve Requirem ent
4 Liquidity Requirem ent
5 Total
6 Usable Funds (1-5)
7 Interest Rate ·
8 Interest on M aturity
(1 *7)/M aturity
9 Interest on GDI * *
10 Return on Liquid Assets
(4 ’ 9)/M aturity
11 Total Cost (8-9 )
12 Cost o f Usable Funds (11/6)
13 Annual E ffe ctiv e  Cost
14 W eighted A verage cost***
m onth
1000
50
160
300
510
490
0.571
48
0.8656
22
26
0.0529
0.8573
0.9111
m onths
1000
50
75
300
425
575
0.68
170
0.8656
65
105
0.1827
0.9569
m onths
1000
50
75
300
425
575
0.689
345
0.8656
130
215
0.3733
0.8860
1 year
1000
50
75
300
425
575
0.738
738
0.8656
260
478
0.8319
0 .8319
1 A m ount o f  Deposit J L
2 Capital Requirem ent
3 Reserve Requirem ent
4 Liquidity Requirem ent
5 Total
6 Usable Funds (1-5)
7 Interest Rate ·
8 Interest on Maturity
(1 *7)/M aturity
9 Interest on GDI * ·
10 Return on Liquid Assets
(4*9)/M aturlty
11 Total Cost (8-9)
12 Cost o f  Usable Funds (11/ 6 )
13 Annual Effective  Cost
14 W eighted Average Cost***
month
1000
50
160
300
510
490
0.575
48
0.8656
22
26
0.0536
0.8717
0.9289
3 m onths
1000
50
75
300
425
6m onths
1000
50 
75 
300  
425
575
0.688
172
0.8656
65
107
0.1862
0.9800
575
0.695
348
0.8656
130
218
0.3785
0.9004
1 year
1000
50
75
300
425
575
0.742
742
0.8656
260
482
0.8388
0.8388
• CBT, Quarterly Bulletin, 1993 IV. 
refer to  Appendix 5 fo r calculations
b a S rt « r f c r t ? ®  m aturity total in th e  total volume o f  d eposits a t th e  end o f y e a n  992
based on Bankalarımız '92. Annual Report.
A PP EN D IX  4.a. CALCU LA TIO N  OF TH E  C O ST S O F DEPO SITS
COST OF DEPOSITS 
DECEMBER (1992)
1 m onth 3 m onths 6m onths 1 year
1 Am ount o f  Deposit TL 1000 1000 1000 1000
2 Capital Requirem ent 50 50 50 50
3 Reserve Requirem ent 160 75 75 75
4 Liquidity Requirem ent 300 300 300 300
5 Total 510 425 425 425
6 Usable Funds (1-5) 490 575 575 575
7 Interest Rate * 0.576 0.691 0.695 0.7428 Interest on M aturity 48 173 348
(1 ’ 7)/M aturity
9 Interest on GDI * 0.8676 0.8676 0.8676 0.867610 Return on Liquid A ssets 22 65 130
(4*9)/M aturity
11 Total Cost (8-9) 26 108 217 482
12 Cost o f  Usable Funds (11/6) 0.0537 0.1873 0.3780 0.8378
13 Annual E ffe ctiv e  Cost
14 W eighted A verage  Cost
0.8732
0.9323
0.9870 0.8989 0.8378
• CBT, Q uarterly Bulletin, 1993 IV.
• * refe r to  A ppendix 5 fo r calculations
w eigh ts being th e  share o f each m aturity total in the total volume o f deposits at the end o f year 1992
based on Bankalarım ız *92, Annual Report.
A PPEN D IX  4.b. CALCULATION OF TH E  COST OF A SSET BACKED SECURITIES
COST OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
AUGUST (1992) SEPTEMBER (1992)
1 m onth 3 m onths m onths 1 year 1 m onth months m onths 1 year
Initial Am ount o f ABS 1000 1000 1000 1000 Initial Am ount o f  ABS 1000 1000 1000 1000
1 Discount Rate 0.43 0.58 0.6 0.6 1 Discount Rate 0.59 0.69 0.73 0.77
2 Discount Rate net o f Taxes 0.3840 0.5179 0.5358 0.5358 2 Discount Rate net o f Taxes 0.5269 0.6162 0.6519 0.6876
Interest on M aturity 32 129 268 536 Interest on Maturity 44 154 326 688
3 Registration Fee 3 3 3 3 3 Registration Fee 3 3 3 3
Total Cost 35 132 271 539 Total Cost 47 157 329 691
^ C o s t  o f Usable Funds 0.0350 0.1325 0.2709 0.5388 Cost o f Usable Funds 0.0469 0.1570 0.3289 0.6906
Annual E ffe ctiv e  Cost 0.5111 0.6449 0.6152 0.5388 Annual Effective  Cost 0.7334 0.7922 0.7661 0.6906
4 W eighted Average Cost 0.5479 4 W eighted Average Cost 0.6927
1. based on CMB Reports, 1992
2. various taxes acco u n t fo r  10.7 %  o f the discount rate
3. 0.3 %  o f the total am ount o f  the issue
4. w eights being the share o f each m aturity total in the total issue volum e o f this m onth
APPENDIX 4.b. CALCULATION OF THE COST OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
COST OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
OCTOBER (1992) NOVEMBER (1992)
1 month 3 m onths m onths 1 year 1 month m onths m onths 1 year
Initial Am ount o f ABS 1000 1000 1000 1000 initial Am ount o f ABS 1000 1000 1000 1000
1 Discount Rate 0.63 0.73 0.74 0.78 1 Discount Rate 0.6 0.68 0.71 0.8
2 Discount Rate net o f Taxes 0.5626 0.6519 0.6608 0.6965 2 Discount Rate net o f Taxes 0.5358 0.6072 0.6340 0.7144
Interest on M aturity 47 163 330 697 Interest on Maturity 45 152 317 714
3 Registration Fee 3 3 3 3 3 Registration Fee 3 3 3 3
Total Cost 50 166 333 700 Total Cost 48 155 320 717
'^Cost o f  Usable Funds 0.0499 0.1660 0.3334 0.6995 Cost o f Usable Funds 0.0477 0.1548 0.3200 0.7174
Annual E ffe ctiv e  Cost 0.7934 0.8482 0.7780 0.6995 Annual Effective  Cost 0.7482 0.7785 0.7424 0.7174
4 W eighted Average Cost 0.7029 4 W eighted Average Cost 0.7233
1. based on CMB Reports. 1992
2. various taxes account fo r  10.7 %  o f the discount rate
3. 0.3 %  o f the total am ount o f  the issue
4. w eights being the share o f  each m aturity total in the total issue volum e o f  this m onth
a p p e n d ix  4.b. CALCULATION OF THE COST OF A SSET BACKED SECURITIES
COST OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES 
DECEMBER (1992)
Initial Am ount o f  ABS
1 D iscount Rate
2 Discount Rate net o f  Taxes
Interest on Maturity
3 Registration Fee  
Total Cost
Cost o f  Usable Funds
4 Annual E ffe ctive  Cost
4 W eighted Average Cost
1 month m onths months 1 year
1000 1000 1000 1000
0.63 0.71 0.73 0.78
0.5626 0.6340 0.6519 0.6965
47 159 326 697
3
50
3
162
3
329
3
700
0.0499 0.1615 0.3289 0.6995
0.7934 0.8201 0.7661 0.6995
0.7099
1. based on CMB Reports, 1992
2. various taxe s acco u n t fo r 10.7 %  o f the d iscount rate
5. 0.3 %  o f  th e  total am ount o f  the issue
4. « leights being th e  share o f  each m aturity total in the total issue volume o f this m onth
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